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From Saviour to Pariah: A Study of the role of Karl Ianovich Grasis 
in Cheboksary during 1917. 
During 1917, severe public disorder and fierce infighting among local government 
organisations characterised life in Cheboksary town, a small town in Kazan guberniia. 
The nominal subject of this paper, Karl Grasis, is portrayed by various sources as 
playing a leading role in instigating and orchestrating these disturbances. The detailed 
analysis of events in Cheboksary presented in this article puts this colourful figure 
both in context, and into perspective. The turbulent course of affairs witnessed in 
Cheboksarskyi uezd, though unique in their locally specific manifestations, illustrate 
the difficulties of administering revolutionary Russia, and of trying to assess the role 
of specific individuals within the administrative structure. This article will start by 
outlining the general course of ‘democratisation’1 in the wake of the February 
revolution, and will consider the breach that existed between the main town, 
Cheboksary, and the surrounding countryside of Cheboksarskyi uezd. A profile of 
Grasis is presented, in order to acquaint the reader with this troublesome character, 
before going on to deal with the development of events in Cheboksary. The now 
outdated model of ‘dual power’2 is overlaid with a far more complex picture of 
conflicts and harmonies among different levels and types of organisations in local 
government. 
A number of historians have devoted attention in recent years to the provinces of 
Russia during 1917.3 Though my work more broadly fits into the tradition of regional 
study established by Donald Raleigh and Mike Hickey, this article does not attempt to 
offer a broad view of revolutionary events in Kazan guberniia.4 Rather, the focus on a 
single town, Cheboksary, and the actions and influence of one man, Karl Grasis, 
offers an opportunity to elucidate the power struggle there, and in this way to provide 
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broader illumination of the course of revolution in the Russian provinces, and insight 
into the role of the individual within the revolutionary process. 
Grasis is an unusual example of a local leader of 1917 around whom it is possible to 
build up a more detailed picture of his background and personality. Though one can 
establish a general pattern of the social and educational background of local leaders, 
finding much information about a specific individual is rare.5 Up until the February 
revolution, the administrators and public figures of regional life in the uezds and 
guberniias were to some extent traceable. Those with suspect political connections 
were meticulously tracked by the secret police (okhrana),6 and the relatively restricted 
access to local administrative roles meant personnel remained fairly constant. The 
local leaders and activists of 1917, on the other hand, are often anonymous figures.7 
Very frequent changes in personnel, and the dramatic shift in the social background of 
such administrators from the pre-revolutionary intelligentsia and nobles, to the 
working peasant which dominated 1917, makes attempts to find individuals within 
lower level administration a difficult task. This very fluidity of the political scene 
gave individuals more scope to play a significant role, as they were less constrained 
by the framework of administration around them. 
The February revolution heralded significant changes, not only in the mechanics of 
local administration, but also in popular expectations of government. The rhetoric of 
revolution promised equality, freedom and justice, while the practical and financial 
problems of providing material support were actually increased by the massive tumult 
of revolution. The ability of any administrative body, whether Soviet or Provisional 
Government sponsored, to employ the trust (doverie) of the population was crucial if 
it was to have any chance of long-term success in maintaining order among its 
constituency. Just what was required to win such trust is elusive; ‘trust of the 
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population’ is an abstract concept, but was invoked as if it were a solid reality. Events 
in Cheboksary demonstrate that this abstract trust was an obscure phenomenon, which 
often revealed more about the perspective of the reporter than any real feeling among 
the population. 
The diversity and local specifity of the organisations that developed in the wake of the 
tsarist administration’s collapse are bewildering in their scope. The Provisional 
Government attempted to establish a local government network, which was 
responsible to central government, through the appointment of guberniia and uezd 
commissars, and executive committees at every level from guberniia down to volost 
and village. Alongside these committees the Provisional Government attempted to 
organise related but separate committees related to the provisions crisis (provisions 
committees) and for the organisation of use and preservation of land holdings (land 
committees). Various public committees, commonly named ‘committees of public 
safety’ formed in the immediate aftermath of revolution, often encompassing the most 
experienced administrators of the locality. These committees in some places formed a 
nucleus of support for the activities of the guberniia and uezd commissars. 
The Soviets of soldiers, workers and peasants’ deputies evolved autonomously.8 The 
Soviets are commonly regarded as examples of direct democracy; they were large 
councils, with representatives usually elected from their constituency by open vote.9 
From these unwieldy bodies, an executive committee and a presidium were elected, 
which provided governance for the Soviet. They often worked very closely with the 
Provisional Government sponsored administration. There was enormous local 
variation in forms of administration, which demonstrate the creative, locally defined 
response to revolution. All these myriad forms held in common, however, their 
attempts to represent and defend all sectors of the community. In the case of the 
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Soviet, this representation and defence was targeted specifically at all ‘toiling and 
impoverished’(trudiashchiisia i obezdolennyi) people. The administration was under 
pressure to be formed either entirely from representatives elected by the local 
community, or at least for existing structures to be supplemented by such popularly 
elected representatives. A report to the Provisional Government for the period March-
May nationally, commented: 
Under the present system of popular elections, the idea of appointment did not fit in with 
national understanding. It suspected in this practice an encroachment upon its liberties . . . 10 
A reporter on events in Cheboksary remarked: 
The revolutionary People must take power away from the bureaucrats and deliver the country 
from disorder. We need to move away from the former situation. We must have regional 
government of the moment, elected by four-tailed suffrage, otherwise the government will be 
regarded by the people as ‘decorations’.11 
Cheboksary town became the capital of the newly formed Chuvash republic in 1922, 
indicating its status as the most important town in the region. Prior to the revolution, 
however, this small town had little to distinguish it from many other settlements in the 
mid Volga region.12 In 1914, it had just two stone built streets, a population of around 
6,000, and ‘it resembled nothing more than a dirty village’.13 Cheboksary’s dubious 
claim to fame was as a staging post on the journey of Siberian exiles along the 
infamous Vladimirka tract. Industrialisation had barely touched Cheboksary; its 
biggest industry was the Efremov saw mill factory, which employed 165 workers. The 
total worker population of Cheboksary in 1917 was ‘no more than 300’.14 The onset 
of war in 1914 caused significant shifts in the town’s population, as many local men 
were called up, parts of the 94th and 95th Infantry reserve regiments were stationed in 
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town, and ‘beggar peasants impoverished by the war streamed into the town’.15 A 
political exile returning to the town in early July 1917 remarked that: 
the little uezd town Cheboksary seemed to me just as shabby as I had known it earlier . . .there 
was impassable mud in the streets.16 
There were marked differences in the ethnic constitution of the town and uezd. (See 
table I). The almost entirely Russian population in the town, alongside a tiny number 
of Russians in the uezd population, is typical of the pattern of population distribution 
in Kazan guberniia.17 This ethnic disparity between town and village led to an even 
higher degree of disassociation between town and village than is usually noted. 
Cheboksary town was the administrative base for the uezd, and the uezd’s senior 
administrators were accordingly predominantly Russian. In addition to the usual 
mistrust witnessed between town and countryside residents, the Chuvash and Marii, 
two entirely separate national minority (inorodtsy) groups, did not share language, 
culture or religion with the Russians.18 The climate and preferences of the town were 
by no means a reflection of the more general mood of the uezd. 
Table I, showing the ethnic constituency of Cheboksarskyi uezd in 1917.19 
 Russian Tatar Chuvash Marii 
Uezd 
Population 
19195 
(11.8%) 
5043 
(3.7%) 
116149 
(71.4%) 
22286 
(13.7%) 
Town 
Population 
6127 
(90.4%) 
47 
(0.7%) 
583 
(6.4%) 
14 
(0.2%) 
 
Land relations, generally a key area of conflict in the countryside in 1917, were 
unusually harmonious in Cheboksarskyi uezd. The lower proportion of privately held 
land there was a factor in this relative peace.20 Another significant factor in low levels 
of land conflict was the Kazan Soviet of peasants’ deputies decree of 13 May that all 
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privately held land, with the exception of small seperators’ (otrubniki) holdings,21 was 
to be transferred to volost land committees prior to the discussion of the land question 
by the Constituent Assembly.22 This was enacted by volost and uezd committees in 
Cheboksarskyi uezd, with the result that there was very little indiscriminate land 
seizure.23 In a meeting of Cheboksarskyi volost and uezd commissars, held in June 
1917, the main feature of public disorder was unauthorised cutting of wood; a wood 
committee was formed in June, which was to have an inbuilt Soviet majority, to deal 
specifically with this problem.24 The journal of the general meeting of Cheboksarskyi 
uezd land committee on 1 August confirmed the impression given by the June 
meeting, and presented a relatively harmonious picture of the state of affairs in the 
uezd. Reports on land affairs were heard by representatives of all the volosts, and no 
violence, seizure or serious disturbance was noted anywhere, a rarity in 1917. The 
overall picture was one of calm and well regulated management of land use and 
rental.25 
Political and class based conflict in the countryside was at a much lower and more 
sporadic level than that witnessed in Cheboksary town. The Socialist Revolutionary 
party (PSR) enjoyed political dominance in Cheboksarskyi uezd, as in most other 
rural districts in the Volga region.26 The overall impression of the uezd was, in 
contrast with other uezds of the guberniia, relatively peaceful; the idea of a peasantry 
split by poverty, land use or political ideology was not in evidence. Reports on the 
July zemstvo elections in the uezd showed that turnout fluctuated wildly from volost to 
volost,27 and in nine of the ten volosts described, it was stated that, ‘For lack of class 
or political struggle, lists were formed by groups of villages.’28 Krynetskii, a 
participant in the Cheboksary Soviet, described the agitation work carried out by the 
Soviet, and despite his enthusiasm for depicting the popularity of the Soviet’s pseudo-
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Bolshevik position, he did not refer to the rural population’s responses to Soviet 
agitation until October. Then he noted that ‘several volosts, far away from 
Cheboksary, yielded to (the Soviet’s) agitation’. This implied a lack of enthusiasm for 
the Soviet cause. Only four volosts sent representatives to a meeting of the 
Cheboksary Soviet on 22 October, where they reportedly condemned the ‘bourgeois 
Provisional Government’.29 
This impression of relative calm contrasts sharply with the political tumult and public 
disorder seen in Cheboksary town. There was wide popular involvement in 
revolutionary affairs in Cheboksary town; an enthusiastic revolutionary reported that 
at the 1 May celebrations in Cheboksary more than 4,000 people attended, in a town 
of less than 7,000 residents.30 In the first month after revolution, as in Kazan town 
itself, a committee of public safety formed, which was dominated by ‘zemstvo 
employees and the tsenzovyi element.31 Here, however, all ground for comparison 
ends. In Kazan town, the Soviet leaders themselves recognised that the Soviet was not 
sufficiently organised to take over the administration of the guberniia, and fully 
supported the committee of public safety, which was significantly enlarged on 10 
April, and whose 260 members included representatives from all sections of the 
community.32 ‘There was no question of dual power in Kazan.’33 In Cheboksary, on 
the other hand, the administration was riven with dissent from the outset of the 
revolution. 
All the sources indicate that Karl Grasis as the focal point for the dissent and political 
activism in Cheboksary, and as being at the fulcrum of revolutionary activities. He 
was described variously by his opponents as a pogromist, a student, a German spy and 
provocateur,34 and as having declared affiliation with political parties of every shade 
from Kadet to Bolshevik.35 Both his supporters and his opponents in Cheboksary 
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regarded him as the individual around which public life rotated during 1917. One 
commentator noted that: 
Grasis is not representative of any well-known world outlook, but his convictions, and his 
alone, as an individual, are the centre of local life, and everything turns around them.36 
He was lauded as the figurehead of revolution by his supporters, and accused of 
leading pogroms, counter-revolutionary activity and corruption by his opponents. 
Members of the Cheboksary town provisions committee reported that: 
Where he came from is not known, how he lives is also not known. This Grasis gets rich in 
Cheboksary.37 
Grasis was only 23 years old in 1917.38 Born to a poor Latvian family, he studied at 
the  local parish school, then the gymnasium, and in 1912 enrolled in the National 
University of Shaniavskyi in Moscow. He was a man of exceptional literary talent; he 
first produced published work at the age of thirteen, and went on to write and edit a 
huge range of political and literary publications.39 He was a talented orator, if rather 
verbose; his speech in the Kazan Soviet of workers and soldiers’ deputies on 22 April 
was so extensive that on its conclusion a resolution was quickly passed limiting 
orators’ speeches to ten minutes duration.40 
Grasis had been arrested in 1915 for spreading revolutionary propaganda, and exiled 
to Kharkov. In August 1916 he was sent to Cheboksary on administrative exile.41 
Cheboksary was reportedly chosen as his place of exile because as a town in a remote 
location with a small garrison, it minimised Grasis’ threat to public order. Despite the 
apparently innocuous nature of the town, however, Grasis reportedly made 
connections with soldiers in the garrison stationed there and with regional workers. 
He set up an underground press in 1916, and printed a number of anti-government 
leaflets.42 There was clearly some confusion about Grasis’ liability to military service; 
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Kazan’s military district commander sent an order to the guberniia commissar in May 
1917 that Grasis had been called up to active service in 1915, and that he was to 
return immediately to his regiment.43 His Soviet biographer comments that attempts 
were made by his opponents to ‘send him to the front’, but that his health meant that 
he was not fit to serve.44 Lack of other references to military service by his detractors, 
in a climate when deserters and shirkers were routinely rooted out and demonised, 
would suggest that his avoidance of military service was indeed legitimate. 
Politically, Grasis associated with the Social Democrats from his earliest days. In the 
first months of 1917, he descibed himself as a Latt Menshevik, and he was excluded 
from the Latt Social Democrat organisation at the end of July.45 His Bolshevik 
credentials soon became apparent however; Grasis organised the publication of 
Lenin’s April Theses in Cheboksarskaia Pravda, wrote a brisk editorial defending 
them, and in June voted against the then leader of the Kazan Bolsheviks Kvasnikov, 
who opposed Lenin’s policies.46 Grasis did not formally join the Bolsheviks till May 
1917,47 but was reportedly already recognised as the leader of regional Bolsheviks by 
June.48 He was made president of the Kazan Bolshevik organisation in September, 
and was elected first president of the revolutionary staff formed in Kazan by the 
Soviet of workers and soldiers’ deputies in the wake of the October revolution.49 
Despite Grasis’ position as one of Kazan’s leading Bolsheviks, he did not form a 
Bolshevik party cell in Cheboksary; indeed, the Bolsheviks did not establish any sort 
of party political organisation until January 1918.50 This is significant, as it indicates 
that in Cheboksary party political delineations were of much less significance than the 
politics and actions of any given individual. E.G. Vinokurov, a Bolshevik veteran who 
was active in Cheboksary during 1917, recalled an incident when a friend approached 
him to cheerfully inform him that she had joined the PSR. He replied that she had 
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made a mistake, since Grasis was a Bolshevik, who was against all the bourgeoisie. 
Her response was that she had not known, and would go and join the Bolsheviks at 
once.51 Though Grasis himself was highly politically aware, it was not party politics 
that attracted support to him, but his prestige and infamy within the locality. 
A description of Grasis written in early April 1917 by the then Cheboksarskyi uezd 
commissar, M. Bocharov, is an interesting summary of his persona and activities: 
Karl Ianovich Grasis, as an individual, has the gift of the gab, and has a talent for attracting 
the common people (narodnyi mass)  to him. . . Grasis seems to be driven, that is, he began to 
attract the common people to his side, while striving for some sort of aims of his own. . . he 
formed meetings almost daily, by repeating one and the same thing, a critique of the actions 
of the local zemstvo. It goes without saying that the actions of the Cheboksarskyi zemstvo 
irritates the whole population of the uezd. Grasis, as a highly intelligent person, understands 
extremely well that he can build up his popularity better this way than by any sort of creative 
work. . Grasis became a well-known face in town and in the surrounding villages. It is 
necessary to acknowledge that most of Grasis’ work is accomplished in the business of 
exposing the zemstvo system.52 
One man that could be regarded as something of a counterpoint to Grasis in 
Cheboksary was Trofim Prokhorovich Prokhorov. Like Grasis, he was a controversial 
figure with an uncertain past, whose background and political activity provoked 
dissent and controversy.53 He was elected uezd commissar in mid April, initially with 
the full support of Grasis and the Cheboksary Soviet. A report in Kazanskaia 
rabochaia gazeta described him as ‘an old revolutionary worker’, and his election 
signified for the reporter ‘the final destruction of the old regime.’54 It is reported that 
he was initially very critical of zemstvo adminstration and the ‘bourgeois’ 
administration, but that once he had established his own power base, he supported the 
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‘bourgeoisie’ and struggled against the Soviet.55 Politically, his orienation was 
confused by later commentators; he was described variously as a ‘leading SR’, as a 
Menshevik, and as a fanatical Chuvash nationalist.56 He was also credited with 
offering full support to the Provisional Government and ‘war till final victory’, a 
typically Kadet phrase.57 
The Chuvash newspaper Khipar, an SR Nationalist publication, asked the rhetorical 
question ‘Who is this Prokhorov?’, with the answer that he was first and foremost a 
Chuvash, and that the foul rumours spread about him had been spread by Russians. 
The implication here was that Russians were not to be trusted with Chuvash affairs.58 
This was no doubt a reference to the ‘outsider’ Grasis and his cohort of soldier and 
sailor supporters. The Bolshevik newspaper Rabochii reported that Prokhorov 
travelled around the uezd inciting the Chuvash people against Russian workers.59 This 
is the rare example of evidence of tensions between Russian and Chuvash elements of 
the population in Cheboksarskyi uezd. Both the Chuvash and the Russian elements of 
the press highlighted the division which existed between the ‘native’ Prokhorov and 
the ‘outsider’ Russians. Grasis, as a Latt, who may well have had an accent which 
would have further identified him as an outsider. 
Prokhorov is  an excellent example of the uncertain nature of the quality of ‘trust of 
the population’. Though Cheboksary Soviet sources described him glowingly at the 
end of April, within a month he was no longer on good terms with Grasis, and 
unsavoury rumours circulated about him. An anonymous peasant from Prokhorov’s 
home volost sent a denouncement of Prokhorov to the guberniia commissar, claiming 
that he had been tried and punished by Vilensk regional court.60 The guberniia 
commissar took this claim seriously enough to make an investigation of the matter. 
The public prosecutor of Vilensk regional court reported that no legal actions had 
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been undertaken against Prokhorov in the region.61 Further investigation of 
Prokhorov’s past, however, substantiated these rumours. It emerged that when in 
active military service in 1905, he had absconded from his regiment with 755 roubles, 
and lived abroad for more than six months. When he returned to Russia, he served in a 
punitive military command.62 Prokhorov apparently continued his unsavoury 
behaviour in 1917.  He owned land in Pokrovskii volost, and at the village meeting 
(skhod) on 29 April menaced his fellow villagers with threats of soldiers being sent if 
they did not hand over some common land to him.63 The ‘old revolutionary worker’ 
had a distinctly dishonourable past, and his personal unpopularity became the focus of 
a number of violent demonstrations in the town. 
A struggle for power developed between the Soviet, headed by Grasis, and other 
elements of the town administration, including Prokhorov. A meeting which formed 
in one of Cheboksary’s parks on 8 March, attended by peasants from neighbouring 
villages, gives some indication of the rawness of the conflict which developed 
between Grasis and the town administration. The uezd commissar Ennatskyi 
reportedly tried to incite the crowd against Grasis, and called on them to ‘Beat the 
swindler!’. Grasis was protected by a group of armed soldiers and workers, and in the 
confrontation that followed, Ennatskyi was forced to sign a paper standing down from 
the commissariat.64 This incident, recounted in Grasis’ biography, is not described in 
other sources, and one has to be cynical about its veracity- in particular, the detail of 
‘armed workers and soldiers’ (the traditional proletarian harbingers of revolution) 
defending Our Hero Grasis against the mob law (samosud) of the dark peasant masses 
is rather too tidy to be wholly plausible. Probably as a result of these disruptions, 94 
soldiers from the 94th Infantry reserve regiment, accompanied by seven officers, were 
sent to Cheboksary from Kazan at the beginning of March, and more soldiers were 
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sent at the end of March. These soldiers however sided with Grasis, and so did not 
carry out their stated duties of defending the Provisional Government 
administration.65 As a result of ‘constant threats from counter-revolution’, Grasis was 
accompanied wherever he went by three soldiers, Ivan Penzin, Gavrilov and M.I. 
Ivakin.66 This trinity bodyguard was remarked upon in a very hostile light by a 
number of commentators,67 but no doubt added to the aura of prestige and importance 
developing around Grasis. 
Grasis was extraordinarily hostile to former zemstvo workers, and intelligentsia 
figures generally. His slogan from the outset was ‘Down with all officials!’ The 
Cheboksary soviet’s refusal to allow co-operative representatives to participate in the 
uezd’s provisional administration is an indication of such hostility, as well as the 
independent and authoritative line taken by Grasis.68 The guberniia commissar 
reprimanded the Soviet, and warned that such matters were not within its 
jurisdiction.69 This is an interesting early reminder of the difficulties surrounding 
power and authority; Grasis clearly felt under no obligation to conform to the power 
structures established by the Provisional Government, and his independent actions 
actively undermined their representatives. 
The situation in Cheboksary polarised into two clearly opposing organisations, both 
vying for power. The Soviet of workers and soldiers’ deputies70 was formed at Grasis’ 
initiative in April. It had 46 members, an executive committee of eight men, and 
published a newspaper, Cheboksarskaia Pravda.71 The Soviet took a radical stance 
from the outset; it opposed the Provisional Government and organised a number of 
cultural-enlightenment events, such as cinema showings and a production of Gorkii’s 
‘Na dne’.72 Grasis reportedly dominated the Soviet imperiously. A delegate from the 
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Kazan Soviet attended one of the Cheboksary Soviet’s meetings in June, and stated 
that: 
Grasis actively managed all Soviet (activity). There was no-one objecting to him for this, but 
almost all the members of the Soviet collaborated (in this domination by Grasis).73 
Against Grasis’ Soviet was pitted the town and uezd executive committees, sponsored 
by the Provisional Government. An investigative committee instigated by the Kazan 
Soviet reported that the conflict between the two organisations stemmed from Grasis’ 
hostility to his removal as captain of the militia.74 Other sources indicate deeper-
seated grounds for hostility. From the outset, Grasis ranged himself against all former 
administrators in the most unconciliatory terms. He held frequent meetings in 
Cheboksary town, at which he agitated against all the members of the executive and 
provisions committees.  The slogans of these street meetings included  ‘Don’t sign up 
to the War Bonds!’(Zaem Svobody)75, ‘Down with the War!’ ‘Down with the 
Provisional Government!’.76 
Grasis made attempts to hold agitational meetings in the outlying rural areas of the  
volosts as well as in town. A detailed account written by a bystander of the course of a 
meeting in Kozlovko village provides an interesting insight into Grasis’ temperament 
and political method, and suggests that Grasis’ radical message was not accepted 
everywhere. Kirillov commented on Grasis’ visit to Kozlovko that ‘there at a meeting 
he directed the peasants not to wait for the Constituent Assembly, but to confiscate 
landowners’ (pomeshchik) land at once.’77 Other accounts indicate that this 
description of Kozlovko events is misleading.  Grasis travelled to Kozlovko village on 
25 May, accompanied by two students. His companions, who declared themselves to 
be SRs, and of whom one was known by a villager, were welcomed, and held a 
successful and peaceful meeting to organise a peasants’ union, and to draft resolutions 
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on the land question. Grasis, however, from his first minutes in the village provoked 
the mistrust and hostility of the population. On arrival he announced himself to the 
people gathered there as captain of Cheboksary town militia. As he was unable to 
produce documents verifying this status, however, the crowd declared that they would 
hear him only as a student, and not as a militia captain. He was extensively questioned 
in the course of his afternoon’s visit, on his background and his activities in the uezd, 
rumours of which had reached Kozlovko. His answers were highly evasive, but his 
actions in the course of the afternoon provide a valuable indication of his personality. 
Grasis was a fiery, impetuous and self-important character. His recent successes on 
the public stage in Cheboksary had clearly swelled his ego as well as his confidence. 
Three times in the course of the day he used aggressive or coarse language in 
describing Kozlovko officials, which excited the angry censure of the crowd. When 
discussing the chief of militia Orlov, for example, Grasis said: 
“If Orlov, the militia superintendent, is not trusted by the population then to the devil with 
him!” The people (narod) protested against harsh words and attacks.78 
Grasis, as seemed to have been his trademark, tried to pit the intelligentsia and the old 
zemstvo workers against the ‘true people’ (narod). In Kozlovko, however, this was 
not a fruitful tactic, as the zemstvo workers were well liked by the population.79 Grasis 
tried to send a telegram to Kazan demanding Soviet deputies be sent to Kozlovko, but 
was prevented by the local militia chief Lunin. Clearly infuriated, Grasis shouted as 
he left the telegram office at the crowd that had gathered there, ‘You will be made to 
toe the line! I will bring you to court!’80 These rash words provoked the crowd, who 
shouted ‘Down with him!’ and threatened Grasis. His personal safety was only 
secured by the intervention of Lunin. His threat on leaving was not an empty one. On 
27 April, five deputies from the Cheboksary Soviet, along with three members of the 
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uezd executive committee, arrived in Kozlovko to conduct an ‘investigation into the 
misunderstanding’ that had occurred. An overwhelming majority of the meeting of 
residents gathered by these representatives of uezd authority made a vote of no 
confidence against Grasis. As a result of these preliminary investigations, no further 
action was taken.81 
In June, there were repeated outbreaks of public disorder, pogroms and violence 
towards administrators in Cheboksary. The causes for these outbreaks are complex. 
Some commentators put the violence down entirely to the agitational activity of 
Grasis, while others blamed the massive unpopularity of the uezd commissar 
Prokhorov. Public fears and rumours regarding the provisions situation were 
undoubtedly a major factor in these disturbances. Though commentators tended to 
emphasise the role of Grasis in leading such disorder, remarkably similar incidents 
elsewhere in the guberniia and in Nizhnii Novgorod are a strong indication that the 
provisions crisis was of greater significance than the person of Grasis. Another 
possible cause of unrest, which was not remarked upon by Grasis-obsessed 
commentators, was the more traditional patterns of regional unrest. As early as 18 
May, worrying rumours were circulating about forthcoming disorder in Cheboksary 
that was being planned for the Troitskii holiday. The town alcohol store administrator 
appealed to the guberniia commissar to strengthen the defence of known state wine 
stores in the town, and those places with large reserves of denatured spirit intended 
for Kazan shell factory.82 
Just as in towns all over Kazan and Nizhnii Novgorod,83 the population in Cheboksary 
directly threatened the members of the provisions administration. This reflected town 
residents’ concerns about forthcoming provisions shortages, and the direct personal 
responsibility placed upon hapless administrators for these shortages. What is unusual 
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about the events in Cheboksary was that members of other branches of the town 
administration actively participated in these riots (bunty). This is not a phenomenon 
that was apparent in other towns, and indicates the harshness of the conflict between 
different individuals, and different branches of the administration. Grasis was clearly 
not the only problematic member of Cheboksary’s administration. 
There can be no doubt, however, that Grasis took a leading role in instigating attacks 
on the provisions administration. At the end of May Grasis had gathered a crowd of 
soldiers’ wives (soldatki), and announced that there were large provisions reserves, 
but that the provisions committees were not permitting them to be distributed.84 The 
crowd challenged the provisions committee, who clarified that there were reserves, 
but that these had been donated by Iadrinskii uezd for distribution to the army, to 
hungry uezds and guberniias.85 Such protest went further on 5 June, when the 
president of the Cheboksarskyi uezd provisions administration, Andrei Stepanovich 
Kozlenikov, was attacked at the town administration’s building by a predominantly 
female crowd of some 200 town residents. The main instigators of this crowd were 
themselves members of the town administration. Initially the crowd demanded 
supplies of good white flour, and personally insulted Kozlenikov. They then 
threatened to throw him from a second floor window. This intimidation by the crowd 
forced Kozlenikov to immediately sign an authorisation for the supply and 
distribution of white flour to the town residents. This action did not however end 
Kozlenikov’s trial. He was reproached for permitting the export of flour from 
Cheboksary, and the crowd decided to take him down to the river station to search for 
provisions reserves. Nothing was found except malt. As a result of this incident, 
Kozlenikov asked to resign his post.86 
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This rising indicates the insularity of the town population’s view of the provisions 
question. Kozlenikov was condemned for allowing grain export, even though the 
crisis situation of other guberniias, to say nothing of the army, was well advertised. It 
is also significant to note that the demands focused on white flour, a product generally 
regarded as a luxury, especially outside the towns. Kazan guberniia produced grain 
for export, and grain shortages there were not so widespread in 1917, yet demands for 
provisions were just as vociferous as in hungry guberniias like Nizhnii Novgorod, and 
encompassed, instead of cries for the staple of life, demands for sugar and white 
flour.87 Where there was a shortage, even if, like sugar, it did not threaten life, this 
shortage became a major issue of the day, and took on equivalent, or even greater 
force than demands for bread in a hungry guberniia.88 
The assault on Kozlenikov was only the beginning of a spate of disorders in 
Cheboksary. Cheboksary Soviet deputies agitated among the 500 soldiers who had 
returned to Cheboksary from the front for field work. Many soldiers were persuaded 
to abscond from their regiments and remain in Cheboksary.89 These men were a 
volatile and dangerous addition to the already strained situation in the town. The peak 
of the June disorders occurred at the extraordinary meeting of the town committee of 
public safety called on 22 June. At the request of Prokhorov, two agitators had been 
sent from Kazan, along with the State Duma Provisional Committee’s commissar 
Rossolovskii, to investigate the causes of public unrest in Cheboksary. Rossolovskii 
chaired the meeting, which developed into a confrontation between opponents and 
supporters of Grasis. Grasis attended the meeting as delegate for the Cheboksary 
Soviet and the ‘Union for evacuee military’ (this ‘union’ no doubt represented the 
deserting soldiers based in Cheboksary). Grasis immediately presented a motion of 
no-confidence in Prokhorov. Rossolovskii, however, challenged Grasis’ attendance at 
 20 
the meeting, declaring that he was a ‘foreign enemy’ (zamorskii vrag), who had no 
place there. As a result of Rossolovskii’s intervention, the meeting voted to exclude 
Grasis from participation. 
At this point however, the presidium was stormed by the soldiers on leave who 
crowded the audience. Prokhorov himself escaped through an open window, and fled 
to Kazan town on the first steam boat down the Volga. The two incoming agitators 
and Rossolovskii were beaten up by the crowd, and Rossolovskii was taken to prison. 
Grasis intervened to have Rossolovskii freed, on condition that he signed an 
agreement not to return to Cheboksary.90 In a frantic telegram sent from a 
neighbouring suburb (posad) of Marinskii, Rossolovskii sent news of events to the 
guberniia commissar. He named a Kronstadt sailor, Khalapsin,91 as the man who beat 
him up,92 which confirmed the prominent role taken in these events by incoming 
soldiers. Representatives from the Kazan Soviet of soldiers and workers’ deputies and 
the Kazan committee of public safety came to Cheboksary on 24 June to investigate 
the apparent chaos. They attended the Cheboksarskyi uezd committee of public safety 
meeting, where statements and clarifications were made about the situation in the 
town. As a result of their investigation into the uezd commissar Prokhorov, it was 
recommended that he be removed. He was replaced by the SR M.A. Alekseev.93 The 
investigative body further ruled that the uezd committee of public safety was to be re-
organised on democratic bases, with representatives from every volost. The State 
Duma emissary Rossolovskii was not at all satisfied by the actions of the investigative 
body, and placed significant responsibility for the disorder on Grasis personally. His 
telegram on 26 June to the captain of Kazan military district staff painted a picture of 
total lawlessness: 
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The terror in Cheboksary develops every minute. It is necessary (for me) to leave. A range of 
pogroms were carried out in Marinskii suburb today. Wine stores and the zemstvo factory 
remain without defence. The delegates that were sent are not up to the mark. One, seemingly 
a Bolshevik, went over to the side of Grasis. The remainder are voiceless. Grasis at today’s 
meeting openly provoked the population’s pogroms. The investigator does not have support, 
and is denied the possibility to carry out arrests. The militia is passive. They assist the 
pogromists with looting of wine stores. Carnage will begin. I beseech you to take measures in 
view of the inevitable violence. Terrorists will interpret inaction of the guberniia authority as 
encouragement, and support is necessary. Rapidly send armed soldiers. A minute’s delay 
threatens calamity.94 
This call for armed assistance was a cry heard all over the guberniia with repeated 
frequency as the summer wore on. The guberniia commissar ordered that 
Cheboksary’s military command be replaced with a new command of 50 soldiers, and 
an officer.95 Grasis, meanwhile, sent a telegram to the guberniia commissar asking 
him not to send armed force to Cheboksary. He also demanded that the uezd 
commissar Prokhorov be arrested in order to preserve public order.96 At the end of 
June, the guberniia commissar summoned Grasis to Kazan town in order to provide 
further clarification of events.97 Despite Grasis’ protests, soldiers were sent to 
Cheboksary, in twice the number initially requested, 100 soldiers accompanied by 2 
officers, in order to take measures for the pacification of the town.98 
The uezd provisions committee reported to the guberniia provisions committee at the 
beginning of July that Grasis led an anarchist movement, and provoked fierce hostility 
towards grain requisition in the uezd. Grasis and his ‘company of pogromists’ had 
allegedly physically threatened the town executive committee, and incited the 
population against them.99 At this meeting, Prince Kropotkin ‘foaming at the mouth, 
declared that it was necessary to send 10,000 soldiers to Cheboksary to capture 
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Grasis.’100 The Cheboksary Soviet denied these claims that Grasis was a pogromist, 
and stated that though his slogan was indeed ‘Down with all officials!’, he had never 
spoken on the provisions question, and indeed could be considered to be a calming 
influence.101 While there is no doubt that Grasis himself formed a core of hostility 
towards the town administration, to credit him with instigating hostility to grain 
requisition in the uezd is far fetched. All over Kazan guberniia, the village population 
showed resolute hostility to grain requisition, and in some places refused even to 
allow their households to be registered for the vote in attempts to avoid the grain 
monopoly. This hostility tended to be particularly marked among the non-Russian 
population, so that Cheboksarskyi uezd, with its big Chuvash population, could be 
expected to show such resistance.102 
Though Grasis cannot be credited with initiating provisions disorder, his influence on 
town life was certainly not conducive to ordered administration. The guberniia 
commissar, Chernyshev, was clearly concerned about the situation in Cheboksary. He 
had received reports on 2 July of an inflammatory meeting held in Cheboksary held 
by ‘an unknown soldier’ that threatened to provoke mass unrest.103 Chernyshev’s 
emissary to Cheboksary reported Grasis’ activities thus: 
(He provokes) exceptional disorganisation in the administration of the uezd. . He does not 
have the faith of individuals on all sides of the population . . .104 
At the beginning of July the Cheboksary Executive Committee ordered Grasis’ arrest. 
The reasons for this arrest were that: 
His agitational activities are directed towards the discrediting of both the aims and the power 
of the Provisional Government, and Grasis brings disorder and arms one part of the 
population against the other; he is clearly criminal and provocative in his actions.105 
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Grasis, however, had the support of Cheboksary town garrison. At the garrison’s 
meeting on 3 July, the order for the arrest of Grasis and his cohort was discussed. The 
meeting expressed indignation about the order for Grasis’ arrest, as it violated 
personal immunity, and heralded the 164th regiment, who had refused to carry out the 
order to arrest Grasis.106 Despite these protests, Grasis and part of his ‘pogrom 
company’ were successfully arrested and directed to Kazan town.107 This account 
written by E. Liuminarskaia, Grasis’ landlady, gives some indication of the 
importance attached to his successful arrest: 
They came for him at 2am. Just as we opened the doors, soldiers with fixed bayonets formed 
a corridor on both sides of the stairs going up to Grasis’ room on the second floor. We were 
forbidden from speaking with the arrested man. Grasis was sent to Kazan.108 
On 3 July, some two thousand people formed a popular demonstration in Cheboksary 
town. There was clearly uncertainty about Grasis’ arrest; they asked that if he had 
been arrested he should be freed and sent back to Cheboksary, and if not, then the 
commissar must sign to confirm that he was to remain at liberty. The real focus of this 
meeting, however, was not Grasis’ arrest, but demands for the reorganisation of the 
committee of public safety. This again emphasises that Grasis, though an important 
individual, was not the most important feature of Cheboksary life. The uezd 
commissar Prokhorov was the focus for the meeting’s hostility; the protocol of the 
meeting declared twice that he was to be sent to the front without delay. Prokhorov 
and individual members of the uezd committee, who were named specifically as not 
having the faith of the people, were brought before this manifestation, and each forced 
to sign a personal statement, agreeing to submit to the demands of the crowd.109 One 
can speculate that the submissive committee members later reneged on their apparent 
willingness to stand down and to be sent to the active army; an appeal was made to 
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the guberniia commissar by the executive committee members for the sending of 
loyal armed strength on 5 July.110 
The Cheboksary Soviet unsurprisingly issued a protocol declaring a formal protest 
with regard to the arrest of Grasis, and the infringement of personal freedoms it 
invoked.111 The Soviet claimed that Grasis’ personal enemies, including the uezd 
commissar Prokhorov, ordered this arrest.112 The guberniia commissar, meanwhile, 
found the uezd commissar’s protocol regarding the arrest of Grasis correct, and sent 
one of his assistants to Cheboksary to clarify matters.113 Once in Kazan, Grasis was 
asked to stand before the Soviet ‘for talks’. Grasis’ own words describe his 
investigation before the soldiers’ section of the Kazan guberniia Soviet, held on 10 
July: 
The majority there sat in golden epaulets. After a two hour discussion about the foundations 
of a lawful state, about the Provisional Government and the Constituent Assembly, it was 
decided to arrest me and to imprison me in the main guard house, without considering this, 
that the Menshevik jurists taking part in the discussion displayed staggering ignorance of 
legal literature. When, citing Esmin from memory, I declared that in the opinion of jurists the 
whole Provisional Government used power unlawfully, I heard in answer ‘This cannot be!’114 
Grasis’ knowledge of the law and articulate manner may have taken the Soviet 
members aback, but it did not stop them from agreeing that he was a harmful 
influence on local life, and authorising his continued incarceration. Grasis wrote a 
letter on 13 July from his cell in Kazan jail, complaining that the days of arbitrary 
arrest were not over.115  He kept busy in the course of his two month imprisonment, 
writing a book Neizbezhnoe budushchii (The Inevitable Future), which was published 
later in 1917. 
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In September Prokhorov was again appointed captain of Cheboksarskyi uezd militia. 
This is astonishing given that he was a convicted felon, and that his unpopularity as 
uezd commissar had been so great that it had provoked risings and violence among the 
town population. The Kazan Soviet of peasants’ deputies reported on 20 September 
that Prokhorov’s appointment was again forming a heated mood among the 
population of both the town and the uezd. The Soviet remarked that the criminal and 
disruptive past of Prokhorov had not previously been clear.116 This is indicative of 
how little informed the Soviet was in some instances, and how information was not 
being shared between the Kazan committee of public safety, the Soviet of workers 
and soldiers’ deputies and the Soviet of peasants’ deputies. 
Such lack of information is no explanation for the Kazan peasant Soviet’s request to 
release Grasis and four other Cheboksary men, with an assurance that the Soviet 
would take full responsibility for them.117 A commission instigated by the Soviet of 
peasant deputies’ executive committee had been formed in mid July for investigation 
into Grasis and the events in Cheboksary.118 Given Grasis’ lack of interest in rural 
affairs generally, and his alleged opposition to the grain monopoly, his support by the 
Kazan peasant Soviet is surprising. Grasis may well have profited inadvertently from 
the Soviet’s stated hostility to the arrests of local activists that had been perpetrated in 
Kazan guberniia.119 This ‘tightening of the ranks’ among the Soviets indicates the 
growing radicalism of the Kazan Soviet of peasants’ deputies, and its resistance to 
Provisional Government bodies. 
Grasis was released on 7 September, and according to his biographer, he remained in 
Kazan, where he agitated among the garrison, alongside Nikolai Ershov,120 ‘and spoke 
to virtually every division individually’.121 After his release, Grasis’ activities centred 
around Kazan town, where he was among the leaders of the Bolshevik seizure of 
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power in October. Despite his new responsibilities as Bolshevik leader in Kazan, 
Grasis found time to return to Cheboksary: 
On the 24 September Grasis returned from Kazan to Cheboksary and right away formed a 
meeting, at which he called the people (narod) to rout and dispersal of all public organisations 
ordered by the Provisional Government, and also to murder bourgeois and official 
individuals, by which in his speech he carried the idea of a rapid ending of the war, shouting 
‘Down with the war!’122 
On the basis of this fiery speech, the uezd commissar declared that Grasis was 
agitating the regional population, which could result in grave consequences both for 
him and for the uezd. Grasis was to have another place of residence named, and be 
banned from entering the bounds of the uezd. A soldier Smolonkov, who was a close 
asociate of Grasis, was also placed under court order.123 By the end of September, 
another command of 100 soldiers and an experienced officer from the 194th regiment 
were sent to Cheboksary to be commanded by the uezd commissar, in an attempt to 
quell the rising disturbances.124 This resort to soldiers once again was a reflection of 
the rising anarchy in the town, and the inability of the Provisional Government’s  
nominated representatives to tackle it. 
Some provisional conclusions can be drawn from this assessment of events in 
Cheboksary, and the role of Grasis within them. Firstly, in terms of the relationship 
between events in the town and in the surrounding countryside, one can suggest that 
the division between town and countryside which was a common feature of 1917, was 
accentuated in Cheboksarskyi uezd by the uezd’s ethnic diversity. The success of 
radical land policies proposed by the Kazan Soviet of peasants’ deputies, and enacted 
by local governmental organs, forestalled the main causes for peasant disorder, and 
left the rural areas of the uezd relatively peaceful. Conflict over provisions was the 
 27 
defining issue in crystalising political opinion in Cheboksary. Public protest revealed 
what were essentially insular attitudes and refusal to embrace the broader ‘national 
good’ that the Provisional Government depended upon if it was to operate effectively. 
This reflects the situation seen more generally in Kazan guberniia. 
Secondly, the conflicts and tendency to hysteria in sources on events in Cheboksary 
have been made apparent. The language of crisis was repeatedly employed, but such 
hyperbole was not necessarily an accurate reflection of events there. The emphasis in 
newspaper and Provisional Government sources on the person of Grasis as the 
instigator and ringleader of disorder reflects their attempts to rationalise these 
disorders. By naming an individual as responsible, they sought to avoid the more 
alarming conclusion that violent disorder and resistance to the Provisional 
Government’s governance was a manifestation of broader popular discontent. Balance 
needs to be struck between the importance of Grasis as an individual and the more 
general conditions surrounding public unrest in Cheboksary. His importance as a local 
leader was evident, but many reports showed a tendency to use him as a scapegoat for 
a range of public disorder and protest in the uezd, some of which were only examples 
of traditional seasonal or food supply related disorde that was more general across the 
guberniia. 
In contrast to many areas, where diverse administrative forms sought to work 
together, in Cheboksary mutually hostile power structures developed. It would be 
inaccurate to try to categorise this dual power as ‘working people’s government’ 
(Soviet) versus ‘bourgeois government’ (Provisional Government). The example of 
Cheboksary shows that divisions in the power structures did not necessarily reflect 
class animosity; personal animosities were a key feature of the conflicts there. More 
particularly, the forceful personality of Karl Grasis himself, who established a Soviet 
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that was entirely responsive to his requirements, was clearly a central feature of 
political life and public disorder. Grasis, despite his status as one of Kazan’s foremost 
Bolshevik activists, was regarded and given political significance in as an individual, 
and not as a Bolshevik. He did not initiate any Bolshevik party work, and in fact was 
not widely recognised by his admirers and detractors as a Bolshevik. In Cheboksary, 
at least, the imprecations of political parties were less important than the individual 
personalities who operated in the public sphere. 
The power struggle in Cheboksary highlights the inordinate power and influence 
wielded by soldiers within the local community. The garrison based in Cheboksary, 
and the soldiers moving through Cheboksary on leave were, by virtue of the arms they 
carried and the group mentalite and organisation implicit to military formations, a 
powerful and relatively cohesive group. This supports Orlando Figes’ observations 
that soldiers were crucial leaders of revolution in rural communities during 1917,125 
but requires some qualification. Though the soldiers were undoubtedly influential, this 
did not mean that they took on roles as community leaders, but rather that they were 
able to operate independent of popular opinion. Ultimately, this assessment of one 
man’s role within the socio-political context of one small town demonstrates the 
complexities and local specificity of political behaviour, and the ephemeral nature of 
popular opinion. 
                                                 
1 By democratisation, I mean that administration was under pressure to be formed 
either entirely from representatives elected by the local community on the basis of 
four-tailed suffrage (direct, equal, secret, universal vote), or at least for existing 
structures to be supplemented by such popularly elected representatives. Where there 
was no element of ‘democratisation’ in an administrative body, it was unlikely to win 
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the trust and support of the local population. A report to the Provisional Government 
for the period March-May nationally, commented: ‘under the present system of 
popular elections, the idea of appointment did not fit in with the national 
understanding. It suspected in this practice an encroachment upon its liberties . . .’ 
(R.P. Browder and A.F. Kerensky, [eds.] The Russian Provisional Government of 
1917; Documents. [Stanford, 1961], vol. 1, p. 247, doc. 226; taken from report of the 
Provincial Section of the Temporary Committee of the State Duma, based on reports 
of its field representatives for the first three months of the revolution.  The original 
copy of this report is held in Rossisskoi Gosudarstvennyi Istoricheskii Arkhiv [referred 
to throughout as RGIA] f. 1278, op. 10, d. 4) 
2 This dual power referred to a mirroring of the situation in Petrograd, whereby the 
‘bourgeois’ organs of power, usually embodied in the town Duma and the 
‘committees of public safety’ that sprang up in 1917, developed as a separate entity 
from Soviet power, which supposedly represented the working people. These two 
bodies, so the Soviet analysis goes, were essentially incompatible and destined to 
compete for control of the provinces. Study of the mechanism of power in the 
provinces has revealed that power structures involved a complex web of coalitions, 
partnerships and rivalries among a range of power-sharing organisations.  
3 There have been a number of studies of revolutionary Russia in the last fifteen years 
which have concentrated on a specific geographical area. Mike Hickey’s collection of 
articles and book chapters on Smolensk are among the most significant contributions 
made to our understanding of the revolution in the provinces. See M.C. Hickey, 
'Discourses of Public Identity and Liberalism in the February Revolution: Smolensk, 
Spring 1917' Russian Review 55(4) 1996, pp.615-37; M.C. Hickey, 'Local 
Government and State Authority in the Provinces: Smolensk, February-June 1917' 
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Slavic Review 55(4) 1996, pp.863-81; M.C. Hickey, 'Urban Zemliachestva and Rural 
Revolution; Petrograd and the Smolensk Countryside in 1917' Soviet and Post Soviet 
Review 23(3) 1996, pp.142-60; M.C. Hickey, 'Big Strike in a Small City: The 
Smolensk Metalworkers' Strike and Dynamics of Labour Conflict in 1917'. (2000 
Conference of the Study group on the Russian Revolution, Durham); M.C. Hickey, 
'The Rise and Fall of Smolensk's Moderate Socialists: The Politics of Class and the 
Rhetoric of Crisis in 1917' in D.J. Raleigh(ed.), Provincial Landscapes: Local 
Dimensions of Soviet Power, 1917-1953,(Pittsburg, 2001). The two chief monographs 
on revolutionary Russia in the provinces are O. Figes, Peasant Russia, Civil War: The 
Volga Countryside in Revolution (Oxford, 1989) and D. Raleigh, Revolution on the 
Volga: 1917 in Saratov (New York, 1986). Other articles published more recently 
which reflect interest in regionally specific studies of revolutionary Russia include the 
work of Hugh Phillips on Tver and A. Khalid on Tashkent. (H. Phillips, '"A Bad 
Business"- The February Revolution in Tver' Soviet and Post Soviet Review 23(3) 
1996, pp.120-41; H. Phillips, 'The Heartland Turns Red: the Bolshevik Seizure of 
Power in Tver'. Revolutionary Russia 14(1)2001; A. Khalid, 'Tashkent 1917: Muslim 
Politics in Revolutionary Turkestan' Slavic Review 55(2) 1996, pp.270-96.)  
4 I am currently working on a monograph which will present a comparative study of 
1917 in Kazan and Nizhnii Novgorod, set in the context of popular understandings of 
revolution and democracy.  
5 For an assessment of local leadership, see S. Badcock, ‘We’re for the Muzhiks’ 
Party!’ Peasant Support for the Socialist Revolutionary Party during 1917’ Europe 
Asia Studies 53(1), January 2001, pp. 133-150. 
6 See RGIA, f. 1278, op. 9, for list of individual files on State Duma members, for 
example of information available on State Duma deputies. The Gosudarstvennyi 
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Arkhiv Rossisskoi Federatsii (referred to throughout as GARF) holds a huge 
collection of pre revolutionary political surveillance material. The enormous f. 102, 
with its 265 opisi, holds the former tsarist police records.   
7 The exception to this rule of anonymity is the memoirs of Bolsheviks produced in 
the Soviet period, of which there are many collections. An example of such material is 
Za vlast sovietov- Sbornik vospominanii uchastnikov revoliutsionnykh sobytii v 
Tatarstane (Kazan, 1965). These memoirs, with notable exceptions, are of dubious 
value as a source on 1917, as their ideological dogma unfortunately overwhelms any 
vestige of historical accuracy.  
8 Generally speaking, the Soviets of workers’ and soldiers’ deputies met together, or 
had a joint Executive Committee (as in Nizhnii Novgorod), but the Soviet of peasants’ 
deputies tended to retain independence, even if it participated in joint Soviet meetings, 
or publications (as in Tambov).  
9 The standard reference work on the formation of Soviets is: O. Anweiler, The 
Soviets: the Russian Workers', Peasants' and Soldiers ' Councils 1905-1921(New 
York, 1974). Victor Chernov presented a very negative analysis of the Soviets’ 
bastardised anarcho-syndicalism, as anti-democratic organisations, which offered a 
façade for the dictatorship of the party that controlled them. (O. Radkey, The Sickle 
Under the Hammer: The Russian Socialist Revolutionaries in the Early Months of 
Soviet Rule [New York, 1963], pp. 139-140.) 
10 Browder and Kerensky, The Russian Provisional Government, vol. 1, p. 247, doc. 
226; taken from report of the Provincial Section of the Temporary Committee of the 
State Duma, based on reports of its field representatives for the first three months of 
the revolution.  The original copy of this report is held in RGIA, f. 1278, op. 10, d. 4. 
11 Kazanskaia rabochaia gazeta, no. 13, 25th April, p. 3.  
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12 The 1896 census recorded a population of 4562. Taken from P.A. Chichikin, 
Cheboksary (Cheboksary, 1960), p. 11.  
13 Chichikin, Cheboksary, p. 15.  
14  V.V. Tiumerov, Stranitsy iz moei zhizni. Vospominaniia. (Cheboksary, 1957), p. 
13. 
15 Chichikin, Cheboksary , p. 16. I placed the comment on beggar peasants in inverted 
commas because its veracity is uncertain.  
16 Tiumerov, Stranitsy iz moei zhizni, p. 12.  
17 Approximately 84% of inhabitants of the 12 major towns of Kazan guberniia were 
Russians, but only around 28% of the population outside these towns was Russian.  
18 The Chuvash are thought to have been present in the mid Volga region from the 
middle ages, but were first mentioned in a Russian source in 1521. The Chuvash 
language is related to the Bulgar group of Turkic languages. In faith, some practiced 
Islam, while others converted to Orthodox christianity. The Marii, also an ancient 
Volga people, were Shamanists. Both groups retained strong national identity, and 
were granted autonomous oblast status in 1920.   
19 Notes taken from kandidatskaia dissertation of I.M. Muliukov, ‘Rukovodstvo 
Sovetov kul’turno-prosvetitel’nymi uchrezhdeniami v pervie godi Sovetskoi vlasti, 
1917-1920gg, po materialam Kazanskoi gubernii’ (Kazan, 1990, Institut iazika, 
literaturi I istorii imeni G. Ibragimov Kazanskago filiala ANSSSR). Miliukov’s 
source for these figures is Tsentralnyi Gosudarstvennyi arkhiv Oktiabr'skoi 
revoliutsii, f. 1252, Agitatsionno-instruktorskie poezda I parakhodi VtsIK, op. 1, d. 
346, l. 87.  
20 Only 7% of land in Cheboksarskyi uezd was held privately, in contrast to an 
average around the guberniia of 24.3%. (Figures from E. M. Ionenko, Krestianstvo 
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srednego Povol’zhia nakanune Velikogo Oktiabria [po materialam Kazanskago 
gubernii] [Kazan, 1957], p. 252, prilozhenie 1; Raspredelenie nadel’nikh i 
chastnovladel’cheskikh zemel [v desiatinakh] po uezdam Kazanskoi gubernii v 1917 
godu.) 
21 The term ‘otrubnik’, loosely translated as ‘seperator’ generally referred to those 
peasants who left the village’s traditional communal land holding, and instead 
purchased land and tried to work it as a consolidated plot.  
22 The well-known Left SR Andrei Lukich Kolegaev, who was president of the Kazan 
Soviet of peasants’ deputies, initiated this radical proposal. Such a prescient measure 
may well have prevented much of the more violent disorder witnessed in other 
guberniias. It was also a direct challenge to the authority of the Provisional 
Government power. Note also that otrubniki, despite their exclusion, tended to suffer; 
they registered a lot of complaints. (Natsionalnyi Arkhiv Respublika Tatarstana 
[hereafter referred to as NART], 1246, 1, 52, p. 5; published protocol of the meeting 
of uezd, volost commissars and secretaries of the volost committees, 15-17 June 
1917.) 
23 Of 48 peasant seizures of land in June and the first half of July, 46 were initiated 
and led by volost land committees or the village skhod. (Figures V.L. Kuz’min, 
Krestianskoe dvizhenie v Chuvashi v period podgotovki Oktiabr’skoi revoliutsii, 
Mart- Oktiabr 1917 (Cheboksary, 1957), p. 127, p. 134.  
24 NART, 1246, 1, 52, p. 5; Published proclamation of the resolutions of the meeting 
of uezd and volost committees of Cheboksarskyi uezd, 15-17 June 1917.  
25 NART, f. 174, op. 1, d. 55, pp. 50-52; Journal of the general meeting of Cheboksary 
uezd land committee, 1 Aug. 1917.  
26 Kuz’min, Krestianskoe dvizhenie, pp. 75-77. 
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27 Table II, showing percentage turnouts in elections of 18-28 July in volosts of 
Cheboksarskyi uezd.  
Volost name % 
Turnout 
Volost name % 
Turnout 
Cheboksar 38% Pokrovskii 41% 
Togashevskii 45% Voskresenskoi 43% 
Posadko-
Sotnikovskii 
85% Akulevskoi 64% 
Pomarskoi 53% Alym-
Kasinskii 
23% 
Nikol’skii 24% Pom’ialskoi 41% 
UEZD TOTAL TURNOUT- 45% 
Figures taken from NART, f. 1246, op.1, d. 102, pp. 149-158; report from 
Cheboksarskyi uezd commissar to the guberniia commissar, dated 9 Oct. 1917, on 
turn out and procedure of elections held 18-28 July 1917. 
28 NART, 1246, 1, 102, pp. 149-158; report from Cheboksarskyi uezd commissar to 
the guberniia commissar, dated 9 Oct. 1917, on turn out and procedure of elections 
held 18-28 July 1917. 
29 E.A. Krynetskii, Kak ustanovlivalis Sovetskaia vlast v Cheboksarakh. 
Vospominaniia. (Cheboksary, 1957), p. 15. Note that Krynetskii’s value of a source is 
somewhat limited by the period in which he wrote; his attempts to fit Cheboksary 
events within the context of orthodox Marxism-Leninism caused some grave 
distortions.  
30 Kazanskaia rabochaia gazeta, no. 10, 21 April, p. 3 
31 Kazanskaia rabochaia gazeta, no. 13, 25 April, p. 3, for reference to position in 
Cheboksary. Kazanskaia rabochaia gazeta, no. 1, 2 April, p. 2, for situation in Kazan 
town.  
32 Kazanskaia rabochaia gazeta, no. 5, 14 April 1917, pp. 2-3.  
33 Kazanskaia rabochaia gazeta, no. 17, 29 April 1917, p. 3.  
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34 These rumours are credited to former zemstvo activists (Kazanskaia rabochaia 
gazeta, no. 13, 25 April 1917, p. 3)  
35 These various descriptions come from a report on Grasis’ activity in Cheboksary 
given at the guberniia provisions committee meeting on 5 July. (Kazanskaia 
rabochaia gazeta, no. 75, 13 July, p. 3) 
36 Golos Truda, no. 8, 1 June 1917, p. 4.  
37 NART, 1246, 1, 52, p. 414; Report from ensign Nikitin, member of the executive 
committee of Kazan guberniia Soviet of peasants’ deputies delegates to the executive 
committee of the Soviet of peasants’ deputies on events in Cheboksary, 24 June 1917.  
38 NART, f. 1246, op. 1, d. 52, p. 293; report from captain of militia Svatkov in 
Petrograd to Kazan guberniia commissar, confirming Grasis’ election as captain of 
the militia in Cheboksary. Undated.  
39 Grasis published a huge amount of material in his lifetime, much of it on literary 
and philosophical themes. His biographer, V. Kirillov, provides a summary of his 
published work. (V. Kirillov, Karl Ianovich Grasis [Cheboksary, 1969], p. 103ff.) His 
publications on 1917 are; Neizbezhnoe budushchee (Kazan, 1917); K natsionalnomu 
voprosu. Sbornik statei. (Kazan, 1918); ‘Oktiabr’ v Kazani’ in Proletarskaia 
Revoliutsiia 1924, no. 10(33), pp. 120-136. He edited and write a number of articles 
for the Kazan newspaper Znamia Revoliutsii (Kazan, 1917-1918), Cheboksarskaia 
Pravda (Cheboksary, 1917-1918), and contributed to Rabochii (Kazan, 1917-1918). 
40 Kazanskaia rabochaia gazeta, no. 15, 27 April 1917. pp. 2-3; from the continuation 
of a long report on the meeting of the Kazan soviet of workers’ and soldiers’ deputies, 
22 April 1917.  
41 Kirillov, Karl Ianovich Grasis, pp. 17-21.  
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42 Kirillov, Karl Ianovich Grasis, p. 22. Note however, that there were only around 
800 workers in the town.   
43 NART, f. 1246, op. 1, d. 52, p. 316; report from the Kazan military okrug staff to 
the guberniia commissar, 27 May 1917.  
44 Kirillov, Karl Ianovich Grasis, p. 33.  
45 Letter to the editor of Kazanskaia rabochaia gazeta from the Latt SD organisation, 
regarding their decision to exclude Karl Grasis, as a person moving towards a split 
with the principles and ideals of the revolution. His membership card was formally 
deactivated. (Kazanskaia rabochaia gazeta, no. 87, 27 July 1917, p. 4) 
46 Kirillov, Karl Ianovich Grasis, p. 31.  
47 See A.V. Izorkin, entry on Grasis in Chuvashskaia Entsiklopediia (Internet 
Version)  http://www.enc.cap.ru/open.asp?id=88&L=5 (25 Jan 2002).  
48 Kirillov, Karl Ianovich Grasis, p. 32.  
49 Muliukov, ‘Rukovodstvo Sovetov kul’turno-prosvetitel’nymi uchrezhdeniami’, p. 
19. Grasis worked as a Chekhist in the civil war period; he was Kazan guberniia 
commissar for struggle with counter revolution, and from 1919 was a political worker 
(politrabotnik) for the revolutionary military soviet on the eastern front. After the war 
he worked as a journalist. He edited and contributed to a number of newspapers and 
other publications in Siberia and the Povolzhe region. Grasis’ published commentary 
on Shplenger, Zakat Evropy, is available at: http://ruthenia.ru/sovlit/j/233.html. (25 
Jan 2002)  His life ended in a manner common to many revolutionary activists that 
survived the civil war; he was arrested in 1933, and shot in 1937. His biography, 
written in 1969, apparently in an attempt to rehabilitate him fully, noted Grasis’ direct 
opposition to Stalin in his time on the commission for Muslim Affairs in 1918, when 
Stalin was Commissar for Nationalities. (Kirillov, Karl Ianovich Grasis, p. 85) 
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50 Note that Krynetskii, Kak ustanovlivalis Sovietskaia vlast, pp. 13, 18, claimed that a 
Bolshevik cell was formed in Cheboksary during June 1917, but no mention was ever 
made of this cell by other Soviet sources, who generally overstated Bolshevik 
organisation and membership. Ia.P. Sosnin, Stranitsy proshlogo. Vospominaniia 
(Cheboksary, 1957) p. 11, stated that no Bolshevik organisation existed in 
Cheboksary by December 1917.  
51 Recounted in Kirillov, Karl Ianovich Grasis, p. 34.  
52 This excerpt is cited by S.A. Artemev, Sovety rabochikh I krestianskikh deputatov v 
Chuvashi v 1917-1918gg. (Cheboksary, 1965),  pp. 60-61. Artemev notes the source 
for this article to be a file in NART. Unfortunately, when I checked this reference, the 
pages in question were missing from the file I believe Artemev was referring to. 
(NART, f. 983, op. 1, d. 1, d. 13, pp. 7-37 missing.)  
53 Like Grasis, Prokhorov later lost his life at the hands of the Soviet regime, though 
at a much earlier stage. A Soviet memoirist noted there that as a result of Prokhorov’s 
speculation in flour he ‘fell into the hands of Soviet justice’ in 1921, and was shot. 
(Tiumerov, Stranitsy iz moei zhizni, p. 18.) 
54 Kazanskaia rabochaia gazeta, no. 13, 25 April, p. 3.  
55 Kirillov, Karl Ianovich Grasis, pp. 35-6.  
56 He was described as ‘among the most fanatic conductors of Chuvash bourgeois 
nationalism, who won for himself general hated from the Chuvashi people. The 
peasantry as well as the workers of Cheboksary abruptly condemned the counter-
revolutionary activities of Prokhorov. But the bourgeois decided that they would not 
stop one of their ringleaders from acquitting his vile work.’ (In Kuz’min, 
Krestianskoe dvizhenie, p. 103.) 
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57 Kirillov, Karl Ianovich Grasis, pp. 35-6, on his support for the Provisional 
Government regime.  
58 Quote from Khipar cited in Kuz’min, Krestianskoe dvizhenie, p. 103.  
59 Rabochii, No. 25, 2 July 1917.  
60 NART, f. 1246, op. 1, d. 52, p. 256; letter from guberniia commissar to Vilenskii 
okrug court, undated.  
61 NART, f. 1246, op. 1, d. 52, p. 259; Letter from col. Sprinnikov, military public 
prosecutor of Dvinskii military okrug court, to the public prosecutor of Vilenskii 
okrug court, 24 June 1917.  
62 NART, f. 1246, op. 1, d. 52, p. 413ob; Report from ensign Nikitin, member of the 
Executive Committee of Kazan guberniia Soviet of peasants deputies delegates to the 
Executive Committee of the Soviet of peasants deputies on events in Cheboksary, 24 
June 1917. 
63 NART, 1246, 1, 52, p. 413-413ob; Report from ensign Nikitin, member of the 
executive committee of Kazan guberniia Soviet of peasants’ deputies delegates to the 
executive committee of the Soviet of peasants’ deputies on events in Cheboksary, 24 
June 1917.  
64 Kirillov, Karl Ianovich Grasis, p. 26.  
65 Kirillov, Karl Ianovich Grasis, pp. 32-3.  
66 Kirillov, Karl Ianovich Grasis, pp. 34. Penzin was also secretary of the Cheboksary 
Soviet. (S.A. Artemev, Sovety rabochikhi krestianskikh deputatov v Chuvashi v 1917-
1918gg. [Cheboksary, 1965], p. 26) 
67 The phrase ‘band of pogromists’ was employed by the moderate press to describe 
Grasis’ ‘personal bodyguard’. (See Kazanskaia rabochaia gazeta, no. 76, 14 July, p. 
3) 
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68 NART, f. 1246, op. 1, d. 52, p. 303; Letter from the Cheboksary committee of 
public safety to Cheboksary Soviet of workers and soldiers’ deputies, 30 April 1917.  
69 NART, f. 1246, op. 1, d. 52, p. 304; letter from the guberniia commissar to 
Cheboksary committee of public safety, 26 May 1917. 
70 This organisation at its inception was known as the Soviet of citizens’ deputies, but 
reformed under the more usual name in mid April. (Kazanskaia rabochaia gazeta, no. 
13, 25 April 1917, p. 3) 
71 NART, f. 1246, op. 1, d.  52, p. 414; Report from ensign Nikitin, member of the 
Executive Committee of Kazan guberniia Soviet of peasants deputies delegates to the 
Executive Committee of the Soviet of peasants deputies on events in Cheboksary, 24 
June 1917. I have been unable to locate any extant copies of Cheboksarskaia Pravda; 
all excerpts from it are taken from secondary sources. Kuz’min notes that the records 
of the Cheboksary Soviet were all destroyed in June and again in December 1917. 
(Kuz’min, Krestianskoe dvizhenie, p. 129.) 
72 Kirillov, Karl Ianovich Grasis, p. 28.  
73 NART, f. 1246, op. 1, d. 52, p. 414ob; Report from ensign Nikitin, member of the 
Executive Committee of Kazan guberniia Soviet of peasants deputies delegates to the 
Executive Committee of the Soviet of peasants deputies on events in Cheboksary, 24 
June 1917.   
74 NART, f. 1246, op. 1, d. 52, p. 413ob, ibid. 
75 Zaem Svobodi was the Provisional Government’s war bonds fund set up in 1917. 
76 NART, f. 1246, op. 1, d. 52, p. 414; Report from ensign Nikitin, member of the 
executive committee of Kazan guberniia Soviet of peasants’ deputies delegates to the 
executive committee of the Soviet of peasants’ deputies on events in Cheboksary, 24 
June 1917. 
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77 Kirillov, Karl Ianovich Grasis, p. 31 
78 NART, f. 1246, op. 1, d. 52, p. 242ob; report from the special meeting of the 
revision committee, to Kazan guberniia committee of public safety, 29 April 1917.  
79 The population of Kozlovko made a statement supporting the former zemstvo 
workers, saying that they were the first to go the people in the days of revolution. 
NART, f. 1246, op. 1, d. 52, p. 246; ibid.  
80 NART, f. 1246, op. 1, d. 52, p. 244ob; ibid.  
81 The text of this whole report is NART, 1246, 1, 52, pp. 242-246; ibid.  
82 NART, f. 1246, op. 1, d. 53, p. 135; letter from administration of licenced funds, to 
the guberniia commissar, 18 May 1917.  
83 Demonstrations, and attacks on provisions uprava by crowds, of very similar type 
to that described above, occurred in Vasil’skii, Ardatovskii and Gorbatovskii uezds in 
Nizhegorodskaia guberniia. (See S. Badcock, ‘Support for the Socialist Revolutionary 
Party during 1917, with a case study of events in Nizhegorodskaia guberniia’ [PhD 
thesis, University of Durham, 2000], chapter 4, pp. 177-179) 
84 Soldatki played a significant role in the politics of Kazan guberniia, and such 
demonstrations were a common method of expression for them. See S. Badcock, 
‘Unheralded Vanguard of Revolution? Soldiers’ wives during 1917’ (Unpublished 
paper, presented at AAASS, November 2001). 
85 NART, f. 1246, op. 1, d. 52, p. 414; Report from ensign Nikitin, member of the 
executive committee of Kazan guberniia Soviet of peasants’ deputies delegates to the 
executive committee of the Soviet of peasants’ deputies on events in Cheboksary, 24 
June 1917. 
86 NART, f. 1246, op. 1, d. 52, p. 349; letter from President of Cheboksarskyi uezd 
provisions administration Andrei Stepanovich Kozlenkov, to the guberniia 
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commissar, 6 June 1917. Note that this incident is reminiscent of many described by 
Barbara Engel in her article on pre-revolutionary wartime subsistence riots. (See B. 
Alpern Engel, ‘Not by bread alone: Subsistence riots in Russia during World War 1’, 
Journal of Modern History 69(4), Dec. 1997, pp. 696-721.) 
87 Kazanskaia rabochaia gazeta, no. 31, 18th May 1917, p. 3 
88 This comment is borne out by the frantic cries across the spectrum of Kazan 
newspapers regarding the shortages of sugar, white flour and tea. See also Engel, ‘Not 
By Bread Alone’, pp 718-720, on the significance of demands for non-subsistence 
goods like tea, sugar and white flour.  
89 Kuz’min, Krestianskoe dvizhenie, pp. 131-2.  
90 Kirillov, Karl Ianovich Grasis, p. 37.  
91 This Khalapsin had reportedly been delegated from Kronstadt to Cheboksary to 
conduct propaganda work; at Moshtaush village, it was reported that he incited 
soldatki to seize wood, with the words; ‘water is yours, light is yours, the land is 
yours, the wood is yours, you can do what you want with the wood.’ (NART, f. 1246, 
op. 1, d. 52, p. 369: report from Cheboksarskyi uezd executive committee, 14 June 
1917) Such sentiments would not have set him in good stead with the State Duma 
commissar, but the final indignity of being beaten up by him no doubt sealed 
Rossolovskii’s opinion of Khalapsin.  
92 NART, f. 983, op. 1, d. 21, p. 31; Copy of telegram from Cheboksary to the 
guberniia commissar, undated.  
93 Kuz’min, Krestianskoe dvizhenie, pp. 131-2. Kuz’min adds that ‘Alekseev was as 
counter-revolutionary as Prokhorov.’ 
94 NART, f. 1246, op. 1, d. 52, p. 408; copy of telefonogram from the commissar of 
the State Duma, 26 June 1917.   
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95 NART, f. 1246, op. 1, d. 52, p. 399; letter to captain of Kazan military okrug from 
the guberniia commissar, 24 June 1917.  
96 NART, f. 1246, op. 1, d. 42, p. 1; telegram from Grasis as President of the 
Cheboksary soviet of workers and soldiers’ deputies to the guberniia commissar, 22 
June 1917.  
97 NART, f. 1246, op. 1, d. 42, p. 2; Telefonogram to Grasis from the guberniia 
commissar, 30 June 1917. 
98 NART, f. 1246, op. 1, d. 52, pp. 404; telegram to Cheboksary captain of militia, 29 
June 1917; 407; telegram from Kazan military okrug staff to guberniia commissar, 26 
June 1917.  
99 Kazanskaia rabochaia gazeta, no. 75, 13 July, p. 3. 
100 Kirillov, Karl Ianovich Grasis, p. 39.  
101 Kazanskaia rabochaia gazeta, no. 84, 29 July, p. 4. 
102 An extensive report from Kozmodem’ianskyi uezd, written by Kolegaev, who had 
been sent to investigate violence resistance to the grain monopoly there, noted that the 
peasants were afraid of the soldiers that had been sent to make accounts of the 
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were hiding in the woods. (Izvestiia Kazanskago sovieta krestianskikh deputatov, no. 
14, 18 August, pp. 2-3)  
103 NART, f. 1246, op. 1, d. 52, p. 323; Telegram from guberniia commissar to 
Cheboksarskyi uezd commissar, 2 July 1917. 
104 NART, f. 1246, op. 1, d. 52, p. 326; Telegram from guberniia commissar to 
Ministry of Internal Affairs, 1 July 1917.  
105 NART, f. 1246, op. 1, d. 42, p. 14; Protocol of Cheboksary executive committee, 2 
July 1917.  
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106 NART, f. 1246, op. 1, d. 42, p. 7; Protocol of the company committee of 
Cheboksary garrison, 3 July 1917. 
107 Kazanskaia rabochaia gazeta, no. 76, 14 July, p. 3 
108 Recounted in Kirillov, Karl Ianovich Grasis, p. 40.  
109 NART, f. 1246, op. 1, d. 42, p. 15; copy of declaration presented by demonstrators 
in Cheboksary on 3 July 1917.  
110 Kazanskaia rabochaia gazeta, no. 75, 13 July 1917, p. 3. 
111 NART, f. 1246, op. 1, d. 42, p. 21; Protocol of general meeting of Cheboksary 
soviet of workers and soldiers’ deputies, 7 July 1917.  
112 Kazanskaia rabochaia gazeta, no. 84, 29 July, p. 4 
113 NART, f. 1246, op. 1, d. 42, p. 9; letter from guberniia commissar to 
Cheboksarskyi uezd commissar, 7 July 1917.  
114 From Grasis’ own  account, as recounted by Kirillov, Karl Ianovich Grasis, p. 41.  
115 Kazanskaia rabochaia gazeta, no. 84, 29th July, p. 4 
116 NART, f. 983, op. 1, d. 11, p. 8; protocol of the executive committee of Kazan 
soviet of peasants’ deputies, 20 Sept. 1917. 
117 NART, f. 983, op. 1, d. 21, p. 579; letter from Kazan guberniia soviet of peasants’ 
deputies to the public prosecutor of Kazan okrug court, 16 Sept. 1917.  
118 NART, f. 983, op. 1, d. 13, p. 81; protocol of meeting of the executive committee 
of the soviet of peasants’ deputies, 12 July 1917.  
119 The Kazan Soviet of Peasants’ deputies, led by Kolegaev, became increasingly 
vocal about the tactics authorised by the guberniia commissar, of arrests and military 
force in rural areas. See proposal made by Kolegaev opposing ‘arbitrary’ arrests, 
published in Izvestiia Kazanskago Sovieta krestianskikh deputatov, no. 8, 28 July 
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Kazan, who from the end of 1917 commanded the Kazan military district. He features 
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121 Kirillov, Karl Ianovich Grasis, pp. 44-45.  
122 NART, f. 1246, op. 1, d. 42, p. 274; report about Grasis’ arrest from the uezd 
commissar to the guberniia commissar, 29 Sept. 1917.  
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